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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
Jazz Haywood was convicted of conspiring to distribute 
heroin and distributing heroin within 1000 yards of a 
school. On direct appeal, Haywood seeks a new trial on the 
grounds that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. 
Haywood also argues that the government failed its burden 
of proof concerning the amount of drugs attributable to him 
and that the court erred by failing to order a hearing sua 
sponte on his competence to stand trial. We will affirm with 
respect to the ineffective assistance and sufficiency of the 
evidence claims but remand based on the court's failure to 




In 1992, the federal Drug Enforcement Agency initiated 
an investigation of an alleged heroin distribution ring, the 
"Nissan Heroin Organization" ("NHO"), and began 
surveillance of the corner of Birch and Hancock Streets in 
Philadelphia. On December 17, 1992, a DEA Agent 
purchased 19 packets of heroin from appellant Haywood at 
that location. Two years later, a federal grand jury indicted 
24 people in a 51-count indictment. The indictment alleged 
that Haywood was a "shift worker" in a structured heroin 
distribution organization and charged him with conspiracy 
to distribute heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. S 846, 
distribution of heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C.S 841(a)(1), 
and distribution of heroin within 1000 feet of an elementary 
school in violation of 21 U.S.C. S 860. 
 
Haywood was arrested and trial was scheduled for April 
1996. On April 1, Haywood exhibited psychiatric problems 
while awaiting trial at the Federal Correction Center in 
Fairton, New Jersey. The Fairton staff psychologist 
examined Haywood and concluded that he had "a psychotic 
condition that has become worse since October 1995 and is 
in need of attention in an acute forensic psychiatric 
setting." App. at 17. Consequently, the United States 
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Marshal's Service moved Haywood to the Philadelphia 
Detention Center. Haywood's trial counsel, James Garrett, 
informed the United States Attorney's Office that Haywood 
was on "suicide watch" at the Detention Center and that, in 
his opinion, Haywood was unable to participate in his own 
defense. 
 
In response to these developments, the government asked 
the district court to order a competency examination for 
Haywood, and the court complied. On April 15 1996, the 
examining physician, Dr. Edward B. Guy, diagnosed 
Haywood as having schizophrenia and determined that he 
was not then competent to assist in his defense. Dr. Guy 
reported the following observations: 
 
       During my evaluation, Mr. Haywood was very 
       withdrawn, had great difficulty concentrating, and was 
       a poor historian. 
 
       He complained that he was hearing accusatory voices 
       who were telling him to harm himself. 
 
       He was very distracted during the interview and 
       seemed to be responding to internal stimuli at times. 
 
       He does not express any organized delusional system, 
       but he is suspicious and fearful that he is going to be 
       harmed. 
 
       Mr. Haywood was not able to give abstract answers to 
       proverbs and he also did poorly on similarity questions. 
 
       He was so withdrawn that he could not participate in 
       much of the mental status examination and it was 
       difficult for me to maintain his focus on the questions 
       I was asking. He does understand that he is in prison. 
       He understands that he is charged by federal 
       authorities on a drug charge, but he did not seem to 
       know the details. At the same time, he understands the 
       possible consequences of these charges to him, and he 
       was able to answer questions about the functions of 
       the various participants in a criminal trial situation. 
 
       At the same time, his general functioning is 
       compromised by his mental illness and his 
       distractibility. I feel that his attorney will have difficulty 
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       in working with him at this time in the preparation of 
       a defense. 
 
App. at 24-25. Dr. Guy also opined, however, that Haywood 
could "regain his competence with intensive treatment." 
App. at 25. 
 
Dr. Guy served as Program Director of the Hahnemann 
University Correctional Mental Health Services Program. On 
his recommendation, Haywood was transferred to the 
Program's Inpatient Psychiatric Unit in the Philadelphia 
Prison System for treatment and observation. The court 
ordered a continuance of the trial. 
 
On May 20, again on the government's motion, the court 
ordered another competency examination. In a letter dated 
that day and addressed to the trial judge, Dr. Guy reported 
that Haywood was still suffering from schizophrenia, that 
he was being treated daily with substantial doses of 
antipsychotic medication, and that he purported to lack an 
understanding of his legal circumstances. Dr. Guy also 
reported, without further explanation, that Haywood's 
attorney could expect "considerable frustration in trying to 
defend this young man." App. at 28. Nevertheless, Dr. 
Guy's professional opinion at that time was that Haywood 
"had a clearer understanding of his legal circumstances 
than he was willing to admit" (App. at 27) and that he was 
"competent to proceed" (App. at 28). The report concluded 
with the recommendation that Haywood's then current 
"treatment continue into the foreseeable future in order 
that he maintain his present level of functioning." Id. 
 
The trial commenced nine weeks later without any 
further inquiry into Haywood's mental state. During trial, 
the court asked Haywood's counsel whether the defense 
intended to offer evidence. The following colloquy ensued: 
 
       MR. GARRETT: . . . My client has told me that he is in 
       no shape to testify. 
 
       THE COURT: Very well. So, he's not going to testify? 
 
       MR. GARRETT: No, he's not. 
 
       THE COURT: Very well. All right. 
 
App. at 30-31; N.T. 7/24/96 at 71-72. 
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The jury returned a guilty verdict on the conspiracy and 
"schoolyard" counts on July 25, 1996. Within a week, 
Haywood's counsel filed a motion for a new trial. In that 
motion, counsel represented that "Mr. Graham's 
psychological profile on the days of trial was such that he 
could not effectively participate in the defense of his case." 
Appellant's Br. at 8; Def.'s Mot. for Judgment of Acquittal 
or for a New Trial at P5. Despite counsel's representations 
to the court, at no time did he move for a competency 
hearing; nor did the court ever order such a hearing on its 
own motion. 
 
In preparing the Presentence Investigation (PSI) Report, 
the probation officer estimated the total amount of drugs 
sold during the 25-month conspiracy and allocated the 
sales to the individual defendants according to a 
mathematical formula.1 In Haywood's case, the officer 
determined that Haywood was a member of the conspiracy 
for about 5-6 months, and that his shift distributed about 
980 grams of heroin during that time period. Accordingly, 
the PSI Report recommended that Haywood be sentenced to 
210-262 months imprisonment. Paragraph 123 of the PSI 
Report stated that there were no factors warranting a 
downward departure. 
 
Haywood's counsel moved for a downward departure for 
significantly reduced mental capacity pursuant to USSG 
S 5K2.13.2 In attempting to determine whether Haywood 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Paragraph 52 of the PSI Report explained: 
 
       Based on the evidence (buys, surveillance, video and audio 
       recordings, proffers), it is estimated that the Nissan Heroin 
       Organization sold approximately 700 bundles of heroin weekly. The 
       following weekly sales percentages have been adduced through 
       extrapolation, as to each individual shift: . . . night shift, 28% 
or 
       196 bundles . . . . 
 
Each bundle contained 10 to 12 packets; each packet contained 
approximately 0.025 grams of heroin. PSI Rep. at 2 n.1. 
2. USSG S 5K2.13 provides: 
 
       If the defendant committed a non-violent offense while suffering 
       from significantly reduced mental capacity not resulting from 
       voluntary use of drugs or other intoxicants, a lower sentence may 
be 
       warranted to reflect the extent to which reduced mental capacity 
       contributed to the commission of the offense, provided that the 
       defendant's criminal history does not indicate a need for 
       incarceration to protect the public. 
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indeed suffered from a significantly reduced mental 
capacity at the time of the offense, the court considered a 
psychiatric report made contemporaneously with the date 
of the offense. On October 30, 1992, Dr. Richard Saul 
observed that Haywood's social adjustment was within 
acceptable limits and that he was oriented as to time, 
person, and place. Nonetheless, Dr. Saul diagnosed 
Haywood as suffering from a "Schizoid Personality Disorder" 
and described his prognosis as guarded. Suppl. App. at 27- 
28. 
 
The district court found that Haywood had established by 
a preponderance of the evidence that he suffered from a 
significantly reduced mental capacity at the time of his 
offense. However, it also found that Haywood had not 
shown that such reduced capacity contributed to the 
commission of the offense. Consequently, the district court 
reserved a ruling on the motion "pending a hearing and in 
anticipation of Dr. Guy's, Dr. Saul's or another expert's 
testimony regarding the likelihood that Schizoid Personality 
Disorder contributed to defendant's offense." App. at 34. 
 
Haywood's counsel did not present the court with expert 
reports on the reduced capacity departure issue. He did 
present lay witnesses, Haywood's mother and his aunt, at 
the sentencing hearing who testified that Haywood had 
been afflicted with mental and emotional problems for 
much of his life. In its ensuing order, the district court 
made the following finding: "Based on Dr. Guy's two reports 
and my own observations, I conclude the defendant was 
suffering from a significantly reduced mental capacity at 
the time of trial." App. at 33. Nonetheless, the court also 
concluded that there was an insufficient showing of a 
nexus between Haywood's mental affliction and his offense, 
and denied the downward departure. The court sentenced 
Haywood to 210 months of imprisonment. 
 
Haywood appeals his sentence, asserting that his counsel 
was ineffective because he failed to: (1) argue that Haywood 
was incompetent to stand trial; (2) present expert testimony 
that Haywood suffered from a significantly reduced mental 
capacity that contributed to his commission of the offense; 
and (3) object to statements in the PSI Report regarding the 
amount of drugs attributable to Haywood. Relatedly, 
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Haywood argues that the government failed to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence the amount of drugs 
attributable to Haywood. Finally, Haywood assigns as error 
the trial court's failure to conduct a competency hearing 




Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel generally are 
not entertained on direct appeal. See United States v. 
Theodoropoulos, 866 F.2d 587, 598 (3d Cir. 1989), 
overruled on other grounds by United States v. Price, 76 
F.3d 526 (3d Cir. 1996). We have repeatedly held that "the 
proper avenue for pursuing such claims is through a 
collateral proceeding in which the factual basis for the 
claim may be developed." Id. "There is, however, a narrow 
exception to the rule that defendants cannot attack the 
efficacy of their counsel on direct appeal. Where the record 
is sufficient to allow a determination of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, an evidentiary hearing to develop the 
facts is not needed." United States v. Headley, 923 F.2d 
1079, 1083 (3d Cir. 1991); see also Theodoropoulous, 866 
F.2d at 598. 
 
Nonetheless, Haywood's ineffective assistance claims do 
not fall within this exception. At oral argument, Haywood's 
counsel conceded that there is not enough information in 
the record upon which we could base a judgment of trial 
counsel's performance. We find this concession well-advised 
and thus affirm Haywood's conviction regarding his 
ineffective assistance claims. This disposition leaves 
Haywood free to pursue these claims in a habeas corpus 
proceeding under 28 U.S.C. S 2255.3  
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Although Haywood has asked us to remand the case so that the 
district court might create a "fuller record" on the ineffective 
assistance 
claims, see Appellant's Br. at 8,16,18, our case law establishes that this 
would be an inappropriate disposition. See Theodoropoulos, 866 F.2d at 
598. 
 




At oral argument, Haywood's counsel advanced the claim 
that the government failed to prove by a preponderance of 
the evidence that 980 grams of heroin were attributable to 
Haywood. Although ordinarily we do not entertain 
arguments raised for the first time at oral argument, 
Haywood's belief that "there was no evidence in existence 
from which the Government could have proven by a 
preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Haywood was 
involved in the Nissan Heroin Organization (NHO) for a 
period of 5 to 6 months" was the explicit premise of one of 
his claims for ineffective assistance of counsel. Appellant's 
Br. at 17. Therefore, we will consider this argument. 
 
Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a 
district court, at a sentencing hearing, may accept the 
presentence report as its findings of fact. Fed. R. Crim. 
Proc. 32(b)(6)(D). At the same time, the Rules afford a 
defendant numerous opportunities to object to the report's 
findings and recommendations. E.g., Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 
32(b)(6)(B). At the sentencing hearing, the district court 
must rule on any unresolved objections to the presentence 
report. The court must either make a finding on the issue 
or determine that no finding is necessary because it will not 
rely upon the controverted matter in sentencing the 
defendant. Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 32(c)(1). 
 
The record reveals that at the sentencing hearing, the 
court asked Haywood and his counsel whether they had 
"any objections or comments on the presentence report." 
Sentencing Tr. at 14. Haywood's counsel responded that 
they had both reviewed it and that "it appeared to be 
correct." Id. Accordingly, the court adopted the factual 
findings and guideline application in the PSI Report. 
 
As we have previously held, "Information used as a basis 
for sentencing under the Guidelines must have `sufficient 
indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy.'" 
United States v. Miele, 989 F.2d 659, 663 (3d Cir. 1993). 
We find that the information contained in the PSI Report 
contained the requisite indicia of reliability, and the court 
was thus justified in relying upon it as well as counsel's 
representations as to its accuracy. Regarding the amount of 
drugs attributable to Haywood, the PSI Report stated: 
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       Jazz Haywood . . . was a seller of heroin during the 
       night shift and was a member of the NHO for a period 
       of 5 to 6 months. Haywood is being held responsible 
       for 980 grams of the heroin distributed during the 
       night shift. 
 
PSI Rep. at P 60. Additionally, paragraph 94 of the PSI 
Report indicated that police had observed Haywood 
conducting a cocaine transaction at 2930 Hancock Street 
on May 14, 1992, which was seven months before his sale 
of heroin to the undercover agent. In connection with that 
incident, Haywood was convicted of knowingly possessing a 
controlled substance and possessing a controlled substance 
with intent to distribute. Thus, there was evidence in the 
PSI Report to support its finding that Haywood was a 
member of the NHO for at least 5 to 6 months. In contrast, 
there was nothing in the PSI Report that undermined this 
finding. Nor did Haywood or his trial counsel indicate to the 
court that there was any reason to doubt the information 
contained in the PSI Report. In short, we find that sufficient 
indicia of reliability supported the PSI Report's conclusion 
that Haywood had been a member of the NHO for 5 to 6 
months and was, therefore, responsible for 980 grams of 
heroin; hence, the trial court's adoption of the PSI Report's 




Title 18 U.S.C. S 4241 provides in pertinent part: 
 
       (a) Motion to determine competency of defendant.--At 
       any time . . . prior to the sentencing of the defendant, 
       the . . . court shall grant [a motion for a competency 
       hearing], or shall order such a hearing on its own 
       motion, if there is reasonable cause to believe that the 
       defendant may presently be suffering from a mental 
       disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent 
       to the extent that he is unable to understand the 
       nature and consequences of the proceedings against 
       him or to assist properly in his defense. 
 
       (b) Psychiatric or psychological examination and report. 
       --Prior to the date of the hearing, the court may order 
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       that a psychiatric or psychological examination of the 
       defendant be conducted . . . . 
 
* * * 
 
       (d) Determination and disposition.--If, after the 
       hearing, the court finds by a preponderance of the 
       evidence that the defendant is presently suffering from 
       a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally 
       incompetent to the extent that he is unable to 
       understand the nature and consequences of the 
       proceedings against him or to assist properly in his 
       defense, the court shall commit the defendant to the 
       custody of the Attorney General. The Attorney General 
       shall hospitalize the defendant for treatment in a 
       suitable facility--. . . . 
 
       (e) Discharge.--When the director of the facility in 
       which a defendant is hospitalized pursuant to 
       subsection (d) determines that the defendant has 
       recovered to such an extent that he is able to 
       understand the nature and consequences of the 
       proceedings against him and to assist properly in his 
       defense, he shall promptly file a certificate to that effect 
       with the clerk of the court that ordered the 
       commitment. . . . The court shall hold a hearing . .. to 
       determine the competency of the defendant. If, after the 
       hearing, the court finds by a preponderance of the 
       evidence that the defendant has recovered to such an 
       extent that he is able to understand the nature and 
       consequences of the proceedings against him and to 
       assist properly in his defense, the court . . . shall set 
       the date for trial. 
 
Section 4241 provides a mandatory process. The steps in 
that process are intended to culminate in a record-based 
judicial determination of competence in every case in which 
there is reason to doubt the defendant's competence to 
stand trial. The Due Process Clause of the Constitution 
requires no less. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385 
(1966); United States v. DiGilio, 538 F.2d 972, 987 (3d Cir. 
1976). 
 
Under subsection (a), a district court has a duty to order 
a competency hearing sua sponte "at any time prior to the 
 
                                10 
  
sentencing of the defendant . . . if there is reasonable cause 
to believe that the defendant may presently be suffering 
from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally 
incompetent." Under subsection (b), the court may order "a 
psychiatric . . . examination" to provide evidence for the 
hearing. Under subsection (d), if a preponderance of the 
evidence at the hearing indicates that he or she is 
incompetent, the defendant will be hospitalized for 
treatment in a suitable facility. Finally, under subsection 
(e), if the director of the facility subsequently certifies that 
the defendant is then competent, the court has a duty to 
hold a hearing sua sponte to determine if "the defendant 
has recovered to such an extent that he is able to 
understand the nature and consequence of the proceedings 
against him and to assist properly in his defense." 
 
Here, the district court expressly invoked the authority of 
section 4241(b) and ordered a psychiatric examination into 
Haywood's competency to stand trial. Dr. Guy's April 15th 
report expressed the opinion, supported by clinical 
observation and history, that Haywood was suffering from 
schizophrenia and was incompetent to stand trial. The 
government does not, and could not, contend that this 
document failed to provide the "reasonable cause" that 
makes a hearing mandatory under subsection (a). While the 
district court did not conduct a hearing, on the basis of Dr. 
Guy's report and without objection from the government, it 
did authorize the transfer of Haywood's custody to 
Hahnemann's Inpatient Psychiatric Unit in the Philadelphia 
Prison System. Thirty-five days later, the director of that 
facility supplied an updated report representing that 
Haywood had become competent to stand trial. Thereafter, 
on at least two occasions prior to sentencing, the court 
received additional information suggesting that Haywood 
might not be competent to proceed. No hearing was ever 
held, however, to provide an evidentiary basis for a judicial 
finding of competence and no such finding was ever made. 
 
We conclude that under these circumstances section 
4241 required the district court to order a hearing on 
Haywood's competency and thereafter to make a finding of 
competence before proceeding to trial. Under that statute, 
receipt of Dr. Guy's April 15th report imposed a duty on the 
 
                                11 
  
district court to hold a competency hearing. Assuming that 
it was relieved of the duty to do so immediately by its belief 
in the accuracy of the report and the government's tacit 
consent, the court was not free to dispense entirely with the 
requisite hearing and finding based solely on an expert's 
opinion that Haywood's mental condition had improved. 
Subsection (e) of section 4241 expressly assumes the 
existence of an expert opinion that the defendant is 
competent and nevertheless mandates in no uncertain 
terms that a hearing be held and a finding made. 
 
We are mindful of the fact that the psychiatrist giving the 
opinion upon which the court relied in proceeding to trial 
was the same professional who provided "reasonable cause" 
to believe Haywood might be incompetent. A trial court 
might conceivably be justified in proceeding to trial without 
a hearing when error is confessed and the opinion giving 
"reasonable cause" is withdrawn by the psychiatrist for 
credibly explained reasons. This is not such a case, 
however. Dr. Guy did not withdraw his April 15th opinion; 
rather his opinion was that Haywood's condition had been 
improved with treatment. Indeed, we believe the 
circumstances of the May 20th opinion and events at trial 
rendered the need for a judicial determination particularly 
compelling in this case. The reported change in condition 
was attributed to a scant thirty-five days of treatment and 
the opinion that Haywood was competent was predicated 
on a credibility judgment -- Dr. Guy's disbelief of 
Haywood's insistence that he lacked a clear understanding 
of the nature and consequences of the proceedings against 
him. Further, the trial then commenced on July 23, 1996, 
after the passage of an additional nine weeks, during which 
Haywood's mental condition could well have changed. Given 
these facts and the additional information received by the 
court in the subsequent proceedings, the integrity of the 
court's judgment was seriously impaired by the absence of 
an independent judicial inquiry into Haywood's competency 
as close to the time of trial as possible. 
 
Having determined that the court erred in not conducting 
a competency hearing, we turn to the question of the 
appropriate remedy. We have previously addressed this 
issue in United States v. Renfroe, 825 F.2d 763 (3d Cir. 
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1987), where we also concluded that there was reasonable 
cause to question the defendant's competency at trial and 
sentencing, and that the district court erred in not 
conducting a competency hearing. We there questioned 
whether it would be appropriate to remand for a hearing to 
determine the defendant's competency at the time of his 
trial rather than for a new trial. We gave only conditional 
approval to that approach: 
 
       Given the inherent difficulties in retrospective 
       competency determinations, such nunc pro tunc 
       evaluations are not favored. 
 
       However, such a determination may be conducted if 
       a meaningful hearing on the issue of the competency of 
       the defendant at the prior proceedings is still possible. 
       The district court is in the best position to determine 
       whether it can make a retrospective determination of 
       [the defendant's] competency during his trial and 
       sentencing. Here, because of the sparse testimony 
       before the district court, we envision the taking of 
       additional testimony to inform the district court's 
       determination in that regard. 
 
       If the court concludes that a retrospective 
       determination is still possible, a competency hearing 
       will be held, and if the conclusion is that [the 
       defendant] was competent, no new trial will be 
       required. If the district court determines that a 
       meaningful hearing is no longer possible, [the 
       defendant's] conviction must be overturned and a new 
       trial may be granted when he is competent to stand 
       trial. 
 
825 F.2d at 767-68 (citations omitted). 
 
We will remand so that the court can make the 




We decline to adjudicate Haywood's ineffective assistance 
of counsel claims. We will affirm the district court's 
determination of the quantity of drugs to be attributed to 
Haywood. We conclude, however, that the district court 
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erred in failing to conduct a hearing and make afinding 
regarding Haywood's competence to stand trial. We will 
remand with instructions that the district court evaluate 
whether a retrospective determination of Haywood's 
competency to stand trial would be reasonably reliable. If 
the court concludes that a reliable retrospective 
determination is still possible, a competency hearing should 
be held. If the court determines that such a determination 
is no longer possible, Haywood's conviction must be 
overturned. In that event, a new trial may be held when he 
is found competent. 
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